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THE PROBLEM OF VALUES' NATURE IN THE EXISTENTIAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONTEXT

Actuality of the research theme and its current statement. The wide-spreading of value relations and forms over all elements and aspects of human life is particularly noticeable in the conditions, which are often understood as the settling of the information society. Powerful information pressure plunges all of us not only in the totally symbolic reality, but in totally valued world, when domination the values is manifested in the fact that all symbolic realities derive their justification only on the basis of value concepts and attitudes. In the life of modern society it takes place a very visible and obtrusive value totality of the whole [1, p. 205]. Even significant changes in the paradigms of modern science are also often understood as the inclusion of certain value norms and elements into the sphere of scientific knowledge [6, p. 212–217; 7, p. 82–88, 342–347]. Therefore the problem of the nature of values naturally must affect the scientific community. Several times discussions about values, their nature, status, relations to things, man, personality, knowledge, science, government, etc. covered the entire world philosophy and some of its regional trends. Contemporary studies of the history of axiology show that in our time we have to deal with some of its conceptual modifications that go out of well-established previous understanding of the values. So, V.K. Shohin, highlighting several historical stages in the development of axiological thought, removes the so-called «classical axiology» period from 80 – 90-ies of XIX century until the middle of 30-ies of XX century [12, p. 17], but the interest towards the nature of values didn't disappear after this period. A new breath and new actuality this problem attached thanks to a number of factors in our time. On the one hand, philosophers are disturbed by the postmodern thesis about the complete pre-programmed statement of human caused by social technologies and manipulations [3, p. 17–18; 13, p. 11]; salvation from such a threat, according to some thinkers, can be devotion of people to certain values. On another hand, the predominant in the modern society pluralism of opinions and positions is mainly based on the individual character of values that are perceived as something quite immovable and sovereign, that can't be universalized [1, p. 204–205]. Finally, the domination of signs and symbolic forms in modern communication processes and sizeable intervention of virtual reality in the processes of life, makes it possible to consider values as something that is the authentically human's feature and is not subjected (yet) to the erosion and degradation. This understanding of values is stipulated to the fact that the human relation to reality can't be reduced to «extraction of information from it», it is very much colored by emotional and sensual tone, in subjective personal experience, in the manifestations and consequences (that can't be explained till the end) of human presence in the world, including – in the manifestation in man's inner world of man's special ontological status.

But the question of the relation of values to the ontological status of man, the question that is purely philosophical, thanks to the peculiarities of the modern context of values' manifestation, on the one hand, is shade by social, cultural, informational aspects of the topic, and, on the other hand, is outside of detailed discussions in the research literature. Therefore, the **main focus of this article** – to try to fix and express something basic in nature and appearance of values that gives them a kind of ontological status, to clarify the relationship of values to a

man, the human person and, finally, to the human way of being. It is clear that the problem of this kind can't be decided in the article, but the article can be a convenient form for pre-registration and short explanation of the most important in the outcome reached by the authors. Because of the accounting format of a scientific article the detailed analysis of the many and very significant positions on the nature of the values will not be given. The authors consider that the bibliography and very detailed analytics on this topic is presented in a beautiful edition, that can't be ignored by any person investigating the values – the study by V.K. Shohin (see [13]). So, we shall limit ourselves with appeal only to a few leading, in our view, authors and positions, ideas and heuristic views of which, we believe, can significantly help us to clarify the situation with the values in the context of the ontological status of the man.

Many of the «classics of the genre», that are well-known philosophers and culture experts who have studied the phenomenon of values, identify and describe some of their essential characteristics and manifestations. It is known, that the first philosophers who paid a great attention to the values were the representatives of Neo-Kantianism, who examined values through correlation with the knowledge and the human relation to reality [9, p. 258–259]. It should be noted that it's impossible to speak about the nature of values without their wide-spread classification because the grounds for classification distinctions are the ideas about what is essential or attributive for the values themselves. V.K. Shohin in his study fixes interesting moments of interweave of philosophical and ethical comprehension of values with economic and law ones. In particular, the distinction between «internal» and «external» values were held first in economic studies (V. Petti, XVII in [12, p. 148–149].) but later was actively used in philosophical discourse. To the most widespread classifications of values V.K. Shohin considers division of them into: (a) internal and external; (b) subjective and objective; (c) subsidiary and final; (c) relative and absolute [12, p. 66]. This list is far from a complete one, in particular, it does not include the value of the a priori and a posteriori, the sacred and the secular, the highest spiritual values and the values of life's pleasures, and others. Finally, sometimes valuable species are removed from the basic human feelings, and sometimes from the main spheres of human life (social, economic, etc.). It is important to note that in various and numerous classifications can be seen problematic character of ontological status of values: are the values inherent in things and phenomena of reality by themselves or they are given to the things by people? The extreme positions on this issue expressed M. Sheler [11], on the one hand, and V. Sheldon, T. Lipps, John Dewey, on the other. This antinomy-an interpretation of values is quite important, because strictly leads us to the question, what (or who) is the source of values? Another antinomy continues the first one: values are formed in the processes of socialization (enculturation) and are the acquisition of it, or they exist in these processes as special kind of regulators and precede it (have the values a priori or a posteriori character)? It would seem that the latter alternative is impossible, because a man can't acquire human characteristics out of society [3, p. 12–14, 87–100], and therefore can't have value orientations in advance. However, a priori is not the same with inborn, it is possible (and advisable) to understand it

as certain spiritual quality of human organization that is able to be awoken and activated in the processes of socialization and enculturation as some regulatory principle. But in this case the a priori items from their earliest manifestations appear as something that actively acts in man and produces a selection and choice. N. Gartman proposed nearly the same understanding of the values in his fundamental work «Ethics». It is rather surprising that a number of quite reputable authors, referring to the N. Gartman's ideas, described his concept in general and briefly. For example, M.O. Lossky (in 2015 it was celebrated 145 years of his birth and the 50-th anniversary of his death), to whom S. Levitsky gave the first place among Russian philosophers of the twentieth century [4, p. 405] and whose merit is considered the development of the philosophy of values [4, p. 391], dedicated to N. Gartman's values theory the only one paragraph. Quite briefly and broadly defines the N. Gartman's teaching V.K. Shohin. The detailed analysis of this theory certainly provides for its comparison with the concepts of F. Nietzsche, E. Husserl, M. Sheler, N. Gaydegger, but we shall refrain from such an excursion as a recess in the N. Gartman's ideas requires another variant of publications, so, considering these ideas, we only occasionally shall turn to other authors.

As the starting point for thinking about the nature of values N. Gartman used Kant's philosophy, which for the first time clearly (although generally not for the first time, we can recall the maxim of L.A. Seneka on the fact that «in the body we are slaves of nature, but the spirit is the master of his own» [10, p. 63–64]) considered the distinction between two worlds: the world of things (what is) and the world of freedom (what must be). Hence from this statement comes the important for N. Gartman distinguishing between ontology and ethics: in the world of ontology dominate the laws, which act with coercion and in imperative way, but in the world of ethics – freedom and choice [3, p. 132]. From this philosophically-metaphysical premise N. Gartman builds a very important and logically justified idea: the man to the extent that he is not merely the object of nature, exists and acts as a free subject. Thanks to his ontological status he is doomed to be a being that independently and freely determines his own activity [2, p. 131, 228]. Accordingly, he has properties of his own to do this kind of determination and choice. N. Gartman quite categorically and strongly holds the idea that these properties themselves, without which we can't speak about the status of man and man's status of being, are the values or value orientation of man [2, p. 130–132, 216]. Accordingly, by its very nature values find themselves as a priori phenomenon: they are organically inscribed in human nature and precede any choice or any substantial (material) contents of this kind of choice [2, p. 179]. In the most general terms a priori character of values appear as the original person's ability to distinguish between good and evil, to choose between acceptable and unacceptable, to realize the psychological tendency to seek pleasure and avoid from pain (displeasure). In a number of argumentations N. Gartman conclusively demonstrates the shortcomings and failures of existing and wide-spread concepts of the nature of values, and founds up that in certain situations the election of some things or circumstances as acceptable and valuable, person in advance, even before the interactions with such things and circumstances should be given, so to speak, the tools that are necessary to distinguish and select. At least, the properties of things can only be assessed from the point of acceptable or unacceptable when a person is able to react to them in this way. This implies such important conclusions from the concept of values' nature, such as treatment of ethics as primarily or predominantly the sphere of functioning of values [2, p. 132], as a maximal identification of the person with the ability to value relations with the world, as the definition of the material content of values, their specific types and manifestations, as the derivatives of the initial a priori ability, and therefore historically volatile and relative [2, p. 196].

We consider it necessary to make some additions to the concept of values created by N. Gartman. N. Gartman writes that values in themselves can be understood as a priori phenomenon, that the value orientation and selectivity are organic

qualities of man, and therefore in themselves values are free from any content and specificity [2, p. 182]. In our view, it contains a certain mistake: in this interpretation of the values they can be only bare, empty form – or rather, only an act, directed in a certain way, or maybe even a stimulus for the implementation of the certain act. Why this kind of form or act we call the value, is not quite clear. This act could be interpreted as a spontaneous manifestation of the will, and in the context of the ideas of existentialism – as the certification of the fact of human desertion in the world, non-specialized character of man, etc. Basically, that's right: all these characteristics of the man are connected with the fact that he goes beyond the world of things and enter into the world ought to be (of the due), in a world where there is a choice and an act of freedom is possible. What should be the act of that being realized person, it creates value? – According N. Gartman, it is a choice between good and evil. However, the actually existing classification of values indicates their output beyond this dichotomy.

N. Gartman held distinction between the value and significance, but he hadn't yet adequately developed the breeding between values and norms. Despite the fact that the value even nowadays very often is understood as the identification of the importance of something for someone, N. Gartman proves the illegality of proposed understanding of values; he wrote that tragic and destructive events and processes have significance for us, but they are not values. This variant of interpretation of values is not very good also because the significance may relate to applications and everyday life situations, for example, can make a difference, where to put the furniture in the room, but this is not a value. When we can determine the optimal condition of some thing or process, we understand this as the norm, which in itself is not a value. For example, there are norms of air pollution, but the actual percentage of such pollution is not value. The rules, which exist for the parameters of the specific mechanisms does not concern values. Therefore, for example, courtesy of the manager we can't directly name the value, because this kind of activity is defined as the norm. So, in our opinion, there is a real need to narrow down the accuracy and correctness of the use of the concept of values, separating it from the related phenomena, such as attraction, pleasure, importance, norm.

In general, working with the concept of values, we, in our opinion, should take into account Aristotle's experience in the development of the concept of the being: the notion of being can't be identified with any one or a real phenomenon that exists, but without it is impossible to determine the status of the latter. Hence, as it is shown by special studies [5, p. 30–39, 65–79], Aristotle distinguished next concepts of being as such: a universal intellectual form, fixing the status of the real things, and a concrete being, which is provided as a condition of cognition, the use of genera, species and individual characteristics. The last you can point out, the first – no. Something similar, but with more ontological and epistemological specifics, offers us N. Gartman when he explains the initial essence of the values as a vague and a priori, as defined, meaningful values appear already filled with something concrete and empirical.

N. Gartman pinpoints the sphere, which contains the values: it is the sphere of the due, the sphere of selection, the scopes that still aren't complete, aren't being settled, or, as he called it, the sphere, located «beyond being and non-being». However, specifying the scope and noting a priori character of values N. Gartman further claims that here acts a kind of «value's structure»; values as result appear to certain extend out of the human. N. Gartman correctly argues that the values can be realized or to be not realized, also be realized in part or wrong, but it does not negate the values and does not affect them. And this again shows that he understands the value, as something ontological, anonymous and autonomous in relation to man. In turn, a person has the value feeling that is primary in relation to axiological acts and reasoning. This feeling, according to N. Gartman, guides a man in his situational relations to different phenomena, things and events [2, p. 131].

In our opinion, the values can't be torn away from the man even in the process of their intellectual constructing; at this

point we are inclined to agree with G. Yoas who grounds that «values arise in the process of formation of the self and the experience connected with getting out of different boards» [3, p. 9]. G. Yoas raises the question of an effort to get closer «to the core of human experience where values do appear» [3, p. 21]. His interesting research of values, in our opinion, is somewhat burdened by rationalism of positivist kind that ultimately leads to the recognition of the social processes as the main factor of the values formation, although the researcher did not avoid from the appeals to personal experience. Concept of N. Gartman, we emphasize once again, we believe is the most right, heuristically promising and truth-worthy. But when we talk that it is impossible to disinter values from the person, we mean that without the presence of a person in the world the phenomenon of values does not have any sense. On the other hand, it does not mean that the values are created by person arbitrarily, and they are a kind of purely subjective phenomenon (such impression sometimes appears when we read G. Yoas's studies about the self-experience). The real human situation is that man in his status of being has a number of real properties, abilities and capabilities. Some important aspects of his entering into a relationship with the world, spheres of the world and phenomena objectively, regardless of human desires, generate points of convergence and divergence between the properties of the person and the statement and properties of the world. From this situation comes, for example, the fact that the desire to harmonize his subjective wishes and aspirations with the properties of the world a man creates, enhances, enriches his real human status, and if he will resist to this kind of concordance he has a chance to stay «half-man», to lose his status, distort it. And this, we repeat, is the real, objective situation. If we take into account the variability of the human individual properties as well as the variability of the circumstances of the world in relation to man, we can understand how the values can be at the same time and without violating the requirements of logic the phenomenon that is «subjective – objective». Hence it can be done an important conclusion: we can regard to the values in the proper sense only items that affects the life choices of man and affects the human in his status of being (including the variations, mentioned above), in a certain way they fits into his life destiny and fate a significant effect on the last. In our view, only such an understanding of the values, carefully conducted by comparing it with the numerous concepts of values, and checked up with the help of them, gives us a chance to understand much in this phenomenon. It must be quite clear to us that there is no person without value relations, it should also be clear that to create artificially or, even more, to impose a system of values is impossible. It is also quite clear, that values can be perceived, but they can be perceived partially or inadequately, that values – is really the sphere of due, choice and freedom, as the mosaic of mutual similarities – differences, agreements and confrontations between man and the world, and it is changing, mobile, however, such that it can't be finally exposed to rationalization. Hence it comes from here the role of feelings and emotions in the value orientations and inclinations of man. Finally, the values determined and designated the special «topos» of man, his place in the world, his ontological status.

If values are rooted in the human being «topos», then we have as necessary and justified the problem – how we can mark this in classification of them. V.K. Shohin in the mentioned monograph noted attempts by some thinkers to identify values related to human dignity [12, p. 183]; T. Lipps proposed to distinguish the values of pleasure and values of the individual [12, p. 57], and the Englishman Dzh. Leydr wrote that the notion of value is at the same level with the notion of dignity, linking the last with the immanent properties of the man's character [12, p. 48]. According to our view, that is developed in a number of publications (see [8]), the connection of the values with the existential «topos» of man requires to distinguish human dignity values (dignitativ values), and the social values, as well as values connected with the things and phenomena of the world (in environment of which takes place human livelihoods) –

valyutativ values. If valyutativ values are formed in society, in the social and cultural environment, then dignitativ values are the attributive characteristics of the man, beyond which we can't imagine the human personality, the qualities that are brought to the world especially by the man. It is a question of honor, freedom, pride, kindness, self-respect, justice and so on. This distinction seems to us extremely important because it clearly indicates that a man can't be reduced to the systems of social relations, pointing us the need to see in person his cosmic universal roots, his organic unity with the general structures of being. We believe that on the basis of careful study of the question about the values' nature, we can do next step in the definition of the status of different sciences: if Neo-Kantianism of the Baden school demonstrated the justification of distinguishing between the sciences about nature and sciences about culture (about socio-cultural processes), now we have reason to hold distinction between sciences about the socio-cultural processes and sciences about the man (socio-cultural and anthropo-humanitarian sciences).

Conclusion. In the situation of actuality of the problem about the values' nature, in our opinion, it is necessary to take into account their relationship with the original ontological characteristics of the man, and the phenomenon of values ought to be understood neither as only objective, nor as only subjective. Values in their essence are linked with the ontological status of man and express this status either adequately or distorted. Therefore, further study of values should consciously avoid unilateral and simplifications as human ontology is organically connected with the ontology of the world.

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Summary

Petrushenko V. L., Petrushenko O. P. The problem of the values' nature in existential-anthropological context. – Article.

In given article the problem of the values' nature is investigated in the context of ontological status of man and his existential and anthropological characteristics. The authors proceed from the fact of aggravation of this problem in the time of development of information society, the dominance of sign-symbolic forms in all spheres of human activity and distribution of positions of pluralism in cognition and inter-individual communication. The authors argument their idea that only values considered in the context of human status of being and in the organic connection with the human self can now keep a person at the level of human dignity. The paper used the methods of discourse analysis, comparative and hermeneutical analysis.

Key words: value, choice, freedom, human status of being.

Анотація

Петрушенко В. Л., Петрушенко О. П. Проблема природи цінностей в екзистенційно-антропологічному контексті. – Стаття.

У статті розглядається питання про природу цінностей у контексті онтологічного статусу людини та її антропологічних та екзистенційних характеристик. Автори відштовхуються від факту загострення даного питання за умов становлення інформаційного суспільства, панування у всіх сферах людської життєдіяльності знаково-символічних форм та поширення позицій плюралізму в пізнанні та людській комунікації. Автори аргументують своє переконання в тому, що

лише цінності, подані в контексті людського статусу буття та в органічному зв'язку з людською самістю, здатні утримати сьогодні людину на рівні людської гідності. У статті використані методи дискурс-аналізу, компаративістики та герменевтичного аналізу.

Ключові слова: цінність, вибір, свобода, людський статус буття.

Аннотация

Петрушенко В. Л., Петрушенко О. П. Проблема природы ценностей в экзистенциально-антропологическом контексте. – Статья.

В статье рассматривается проблема природы ценностей в контексте онтологического статуса человека и его антропологических и экзистенциальных характеристик. Авторы исходят из факта обострения данной проблемы в условиях становления информационного общества, доминирования во всех сферах человеческой жизнедеятельности знаково-символических форм и распространения позиции плюрализма в познании и межиндивидуальной коммуникации. Авторы аргументируют свое убеждение тем, что только ценности, рассматриваемые в контексте человеческого статуса бытия и в органической связи с человеческой самостью, способны сегодня удержать человека на уровне человеческого достоинства. В статье использованы методы дискурс-анализа, компаративистики и герменевтического анализа.

Ключевые слова: ценность, выбор, свобода, человеческий статус бытия.